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EQUITABLE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF
UNDER THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Insofar as the availability of equitable or declaratory relief un-
der the Indian Civil Rights Act of 19681 has not been definitively
explored, this note will consider that topic and its possible ramifi-
cations on tribal autonomy. Before passage of this Act, tribal gov-
ernments were under no constitutional restraints in the exercise of
their power over tribal members. 2  Although this prior situation
might be viewed as highly offensive by the average Anglo-American,
the fact remains that the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 will, to a
large extent, undermine the autonomy of the Indian tribes. Its af-
fect will be to usurp yet another area from the already limited jur-
isdiction of the tribal courts, and make the federal courts the final
arbiter. This note will discuss the availability of equitable and dec:
laratory relief under the Act, and suggest possible ways in which
its undermining impact on tribal autonomy can be minimized.
I. JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
1. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-824, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77 (codtified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1302-1303 (1970) ), the text of which Is as follows:
No Indian tribe In exercising powers of self-government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to as-
semble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person In any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without Just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and -public
trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual Pun-
ishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or PUn-
ishment greater than Imprisoment for a term of six months or a fine of $500, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its Jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or
deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any Person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the
right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
5 1303. Habeas Corpua
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a
court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian
tribe.
2. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (Sixth Amendment right to grand
Jury); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959)
(First Amendment freedom of religion) ; Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 563 (8th
Cir. 1958) (Fifth Amendment due process); Glover v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 19
(D. Mont. 1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
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A. Habeas Corpus as an Exclusive Remedy
The Indian Civil Rights Act vested individual Indians-subject to
the jurisdiction of tribes exercising the powers of self-government-
with substantially all3 of the constitutional guarantees contained in
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. While it has been repeatedly held that the Constitution
of the United States does not apply to tribes exercising the powers
of self-government,4 the Ninth Circuit hinted that it would intervene
where the action of the tribe had become "so summary and arbi-
trary as to shock the conscience of the federal court." Thus, the
Act has been referred to as an extrication of the individual Indian
from a "legal no man's land"6 created by such prior decisions.
The Act, however, does not mention remedies other than to pro-
vide that the writ of habeas corpus shall be available in the federal
courts to test the legality of the detention of any person by order
of an Indian tribe.7 It has been argued that since no other remedy
is mentioned, Congress intended to limit the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts to reviewing writs of habeas corpus." This argument
has not met with any success. Unless on its face the words of an
act are "so free from doubt [that] they must be taken as the
final expression of the legislative intent,"8 the legislative history
must be examined for evidence of Congressional purpose.10 Yet, the
legislative history of the Act is not clearly dispositive of the exclu-
sivity of the habeas corpus remedy. Although it has been argued that
"[tlhe Senate committee expresses no intention to limit remedies
to habeas corpus,"'" this conclusion appears to have been based on
a general reaction to the committee reports; no specific language is
cited in its treatment of remedies.
Various statements by several Congressmen, however, militate
against the limitation of remedies to habeas corpus through recog-
nition of the existing dearth of protection:
[A]s the hearings developed and as the evidence and tes-
3. The main part of the statute incorporates amendments one and four through eight
of the Bill of Rights with the following exceptions: establishment of religion is not pro-
hibited; the right to counsel Is guaranteed only at the defendant's own expense; the
imposition of a penalty or punishment for any one offense Is limited to imprisonment
for a term of six months or a fine of $500, or both; there Is no right to indictment by
a grand jury and the petit jury assures a jury of six members in all cases involving
the possibility of imprisonment. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
4. See note 2 supra.
5. Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1969); accord, Colli-
flower v. Garland, 432 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
6. Solomon v. LaRose, 335 F. Supp. 715, 718 (D. Neb. 1971).
7. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
8. Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370, 372 (D. N.M. 1971).
9. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917).
10. Id.
11. Comment, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constittutional Status of Tribal Gov-
ernments, 82 HRv, L, ;lsv, 1343i 1371 (19§qP) [hereinafter cited as HAnv. CMou.].
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timony were taken, I believe all of us who were students of
the law were jarred and shocked by the conditions as far
as the constitutional rights for members of the Indian tribes
were concerned. There was found to be unchecked and un-
limited authority over many facets of Indian rights. There
was a failure to conform to many of the elemental and tra-
ditional safeguards. The Constitution simply was not appli-
cable.1
2
The Congressmen were very much aware of the wide range of rights
encompassed by the Act:
[I]n the sixth title of the bill [later condensed and amend-
ed into the present three sections] we have a very splendid
document which will protect the rights of the American In-
dians in many ways and bring those rights up to date .... 18
The importance of the rights, and the historical record of an estab-
lished policy of the federal judiciary refusing to apply any constitu-
tional prohibitions against the tribes, suggests that Congress intend-
ed this Act as a reversal of that policy. The limited remedy of habeas
corpus would not meet that goal.
In the first case to be decided under the Act, Dodge v. Nakai4 ,
the court found that a remedy by way of injunction was appropriate
relief and habeas corpus was not even discussed. In the latest case
discussing the exclusivity of habeas corpus 5 the court stated:
It does not follow that Congress intended section 1303 [writ
of habeas corpus] to be the exclusive jurisdictional basis
for enforcement. Such a finding would render nugatory the
rights secured by provisions (1), (5) and (8) of [the Indian
Civil Rights Act.] 16
If the only means available for enforcement of the Act were
through a habeas corpus proceeding, the Act would have indeed
been an empty gesture since review of tribal action by a writ of
habeas corpus was already partially established in 1965. In Colli-
flower v. Garland, 1" the petitioner, an Indian and a member of the
Gros Ventre Indian tribe, had been sentenced to five days in jail for
disobeying an order of the tribal court. The Ninth Circuit found that
the reservation had been established under an order of the Secretary
12. 113 CoNG. REc. 35473 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1967) (remarks of Senator Hruska of
Nekraska).
13. Id.
14. 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
15. Solomon v. Lalose, 335 F. Supp. 715 (D. Neb. 1969).
16. Id. at 719, see Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370, 372 (D. N.M. 1971), "[I]f
enlforcement of the Act were limited to habeas corpus proceedings, some provisions of
the Act would be unenforceable and thus meaningless."
17. 342 F.24 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
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of the Interior, that the Indian police and judges were federally
funded; and, that the tribal code was based on regulations promul-
gated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Based on these facts, the
court stated that the Indian courts on that particular reservation
were at least in part, "arms of the federal government," '18 and held
that, under these circumstances, it was proper for the court to issue
the writ of habeas corpus. 19 Although the availability of writs under
Colliflower might be limited to the twelve Courts of Indian Offenses,
20
the Ninth Circuit, as stated earlier, had intimated that it would as-
sume jurisdiction where the action of the tribe was "so summary
and arbitrary as to shock the conscience of the federal court."'1
B. Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343 (4) and 1331
The Indian Civil Rights Act does not refer to any jurisdictional
statute under which claims brought pursuant to its provisions may
be heard. Nonetheless, the courts have found jurisdiction by virtue
of two sections of the United States Code granting federal district
courts original jurisdiction. 22 Of these cases, Dodge v. Nakai" and
Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe,24 most clearly develop the argu-
ment that the federal district court's original jurisdiction to protect
civil rights should extend to Indians. 25 Both cases relied on Jones
v. Mayer2 6 as authority that "a positive statutory declaration of a
right to commence an action is not required ' 27 to initiate an action
under such a jurisdictional grant.2 8 In Jones, the district court
sustained its jurisdiction to redress an alleged violation of a federally
protected right accruing from a discriminatory refusal of the plain-
tiff's offer to buy a house. Although the statute, declaratory of
the rights of citizens, does not authorize the filing of a civil action,
the Supreme Court stated:
The fact that [this statute] is couched in declaratory terms
18. Id. at 379.
19. Id.
20. HAYRv. COMm. at 1357, n. 64.
21. Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1969).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief un-
'
der any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, in-
cluding the right to vote.
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970):
(a)The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interests and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.
28. 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
24. 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
26. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
27. Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D. Mont. 1996). See also
Dodge v. Nakal, 298 F. Supp. 17, 25 (D. Ariz. 1968).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
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and provides no explicit method of enforcement does not, of
course, prevent a federal court from fashioning an effective
equitable remedy.
29
In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,80 the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed this position and arguably extended its reasoning to provide
original jurisdiction s' for claims arising under the civil rights stat-
utes82 guaranteeing equality in the formation of contracts with no
provision for a remedy.32 Cases cited by the Supreme Court in Jones"
provide evidence of a strong presumption against construing a statute
so as to create a legal right while denying a remedy.
Two district courts have rejected claims based on original
civil rights jurisdiction. 5 In Luxon v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 6 the
district court had relied extensively on Pinnow v. Shoshone Tribal
Council.87 Without any express reference to such original juris-
diction the court in Pinnow stated that since §1303 was the only
provision providing for federal jurisdiction, in the absence of ex-
press congressional authority conferring jurisdiction on the federal
court, it "must refrain from assuming jurisdiction where it has
none."88 However, the Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court
in Luxon. This is instructive insofar as it perceived that:
The Tenth Circuit based its affirmance [of Pinnow] upon'
the trial court's findings that the complaints, themselves,
failed to state facts which showed a denial of due process or
equal protection rather than on the ground that the district
court had no jurisdiction. 39
Thus, the proposition that the Act comes within the category of
29. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 414, n. 13 (1968).
30. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
31. Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 25 (D. Ariz. 1968) (citing 88 S.Ct. at 2189-2190,
n: 13); accord, Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont 1969).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970):
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be -parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is en-
joyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970):
All citizens of the United States shall have the same rights, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, pur-
chase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
33. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Mizell v. North Broward Hospital Dis-
trict, 427 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1970-) stated:
Jones v. Mayer, of course, dealt with section 1982 which, so far as
here pertinent, is precisely like section 1981 in that it makes no provision
for 'civil damages or any other form of relief . .. .
84. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
36. 337 F. Supp. 243 (D. S.D. 1971), rev'd., 455 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1972).
37. 314 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Wyo. 1970) ; aff'd. sub. nom., Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal
Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971).
38. 314 F. Supp. 1157, 1160 (D. Wyo. 1970).
89. Luxon v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 455 F.2d 698, 700 (Sth Cir. 1972).
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civil rights for which a civil action may be implied in law for pur-
poses of invoking jurisdiction is well established.
Jurisdiction may also be established under a federal provision"
providing the district courts with jurisdiction over civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000, and arises under
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. One court, en-
tertaining a claim arising under the Act, has found jurisdiction to
exist exclusively under this section4 ' and several cases have relied
on the section as a ground for jurisdiction in the alternative.4
2
Pinnow and Groundhog v. Keeler, the two cases dismissing ac-
tions under this jurisdictional basis are not strong authority that
the $10,000 provision does not provide jurisdiction for claims brought
within its provisions. In affirming the lower court's dismissal in
Pinnow, the Tenth Circuit relied exclusively on the plaintiff's failure
to establish either a denial of equal protection or due process. 43 In
Groundhog, apart from the claim's lacking substance, counsel for
the plaintiff apparently only asserted that the claim was one arising
under the Constitution of the United States" and did not assert, as
he should have, that it arose under the laws of the United States.
The Indian Civil Rights Act clearly meets the criteria of being
a law of the United States; the amount in controversy requirement
will generally be established by the pleadings. (The plaintiffs in
Spotted Eagle also sought damages, but could only satisfy the re-
quisite amount by aggregating their claims, a practice held imper-
missable by the Court in Snyder v. Harris45). The remaining prob-
lem, then, is the requirement that the federal question be "substan-
tial;" this presents a unique dilemma because the section embodying
this requirement46 includes some of the most litigated, and most im-
portant, phrases in American jurisprudence. 47 In determining
whether the federal question presented is "substantial," the courts
will no doubt be forced to rely upon the principle of stare decisis.
Thus, the court in the Dodge case relied upon the test espoused in
Cohens v. Virginia,"8 holding that a case arises under the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States "whenever its correct decision
depends on the construction of either."'
9
While this requirement of "substantiality" is a judicially imposed
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970), quoted in note 21 supra.
41. Loncasslon v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D. N.M. 1971).
42. See e.g., Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969) ; Dodge
v. Nakal, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
43. Pinnow v. Shoshone Tribal Council, 314 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Mont. 1970), aff'd sub.
nom., 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971).
44. Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971).
45. 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
46. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
47. E.g., "freedom of speech", "probable cause". "equal protection" and "due process".
48. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
49. Id. at 298; see also Dodge v. Nakal, 298 F. Supp. 17, 21 (D. Ariz. 1968).
NOTES
doctrine of self-restraint, its limiting effect on cases presented un-
der the Act will no doubt be minimal in light of the highly litigable
nature of the language employed. And even though courts may be
justified in many instances in applying the principle of stare decisis,
they should not do so before giving strong consideration and defer-
ence to the unique character of the various tribal governmental
systems.
C. Incursions on the "Internal Affairs" Doctrine
Until 1968, the federal courts had held that they had no jurisdic-
tion over what were termed intra-tribal controversies." One example
of what constitutes an intra-tribal controversy is found in Martinez v.
Southern Ute Tribe5 ' where the court held that the tribe had com-
plete authority to determine all questions of its own membership
as a political entity. There is now a strong indication, however, that
the federal courts will assume jurisdiction over cases which had
previously been labelled as strictly internal affairs and left to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal courts.
In Pinnow v. Shoshone Tribal Council,5 2 the plaintiffs sought a
review of the enrollment procedures of the Shoshone and Arapahoe
tribes. The tribal enrollment ordinances, approved by the Secretary
of the Interior, required that in order to become an enrolled tribal
member the applicant must possess one-quarter degree of Indian
blood. The children of the plaintiffs possessed less than the requisite
amount of Indian blood. While the district court stated that the situa-
tion involved an intra-tribal controversy and, hence, was not with-
in the jurisdiction of the federal courts, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit stated "it may well be that tribal enrollment practices
are now subject to the statutory requirements of equal protection
and due process as provided in 25 U.S.C. §1302 (8) ."53 The court,
however, did not decide whether such a restraint existed, but held
that the amended complaints and affidavits failed to disclose any
denial of due process or equal protection. Incursion into the "inter-
nal affairs" doctrine was also intimated in Luxon v. Rosebud Sioux
Tribe,54 where the plaintiff sought to run for tribal council, but
was precluded from doing so by the tribal constitution which ren-
ders employees of the Public Health Service ineligible for candidacy.
Without passing upon the merits, the Court of Appeals sustained
its jurisdiction and stated:
50. Pinnow v. Shoshone Tribal Council, 314 F. Supp. 1157, 1160 (D. Wyo. 1970), afjf'
aub. nom., 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971).
51. 249 F.2d 915 (10th Mr. 1957).
52. 314 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Wyo. 1970), aff1d. sub. nom., 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971).
58. Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F2d 278, 281 (10th Cir. 1971).
54. 455 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1972).
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The district court refused injunctive relief and dismissed
the action on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction 'to hear
intratribal controversies.' This certainly was true prior to
the passage, in 1968, of the Indian Bill of Rights, 25 U.S.C.
§§1302-03 .... However, since the 'enactment of these consti-
tutional safeguards, as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
that conclusion does not necessarily follow. 5
While not deciding whether the case involved an internal affair
of the tribe, the court in Groundhog v. Keeler noted:
It is also clear from such report that Congress was con-
cerned primarily with tribal administration of justice and
imposition of penalties and forfeitures, and not with the
specifics of tribal structure and officeholding. 56
If this is so, then review of intra-tribal controversies would seem
to be largely unwarranted. Incursion into these affairs, which were
previously left to the tribes, will effectively sabotage any policy re-
garding Indians couched in terms of "self-determination."
The single case decided since passage of the Act rejecting fed-
eral jurisdiction over an intra-tribal controversy in Hein v. Nickol-
son. 57 In this case the plaintiff alleged that she had been an enrolled
member of the Colville Confederated Tribes until her 1956 marriage
to a Canadian Indian. By Canadian law, the plaintiff automatically
became a member of her husband's tribe as a result of her mar-
riage; and she was disenrolled by the Colville Confederated Tribe.
After plaintiff's husband died she remarried a non-Indian and con-
sequently forfeited her membership in the Canadian band of Indians.
In October of 1969 the plaintiff applied for membership in the Col-
vile Confederated Tribe, but her application was denied.58 The fed-
eral district court dismissed plaintiff's action, alleging a denial of
equal protection under the Act, or lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion "because a dispute involving membership in a tribe does not
present a federal question. ' 59 The government's brief in support of
the motion to dismiss is instructive:
The Indian Bill of Rights is new legislation, and has been
law for less than three years. As a result, the decisions in-
terpreting the Act are relatively few in number. However,
those cases have shown a reluctance on the part of the Courts
to interfere in intra-tribal matters when no deprivation of
55. Id. at 699.
56. 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971).
57. Civil No. 3459 (E.D. Wash., Nov. 30, 1971).
58. Amended complaint at 2-3, Hein v. Nickolson, Civil No. 3459 (E.D. Wash., Nov.
30, 1971,
59. Hein v. Nicholson, Civil No. 3459 (E.D. Wash., Nov. 30, 1971).
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rights has been clearly alleged. In each case in which a Court
has ruled jurisdiction existed under the Indian Bill of Rights,
clear and serious deprivations of rights were alleged.6°.
Thus, there is a possibility that infringements upon the internal
affairs doctrine can be limited to those situations where the dep-
rivation of rights is "clear and serious." 6' The delineation as to
what constitutes a "clear and serious" deprivation of rights will
presumably be left to the courts. If so, it is important that the federal
courts reassert a doctrinal basis for the protection of tribal auton-
omy in cases arising under the Act.
Several rulings by the Department of the Interior would seem
to militate in favor of reviewing actions of the tribe which were pre-
viously considered internal. One controversy involved classification
for the purpose of tribal membership. The Jacarilla Apache Tribe
had revised its constitution, placing more restrictive membership
requirements on illegitimate children than were placed on persons
born in legal wedlock. After stating that such action by a tribe prior
to 1968 was unlikely to have been questioned, the Deputy Solicitor
found that such classification was not based upon an essential re-
quirement of an Indian tribe, served no rational purpose and abro-
gated a fundamental right of membership and was, therefore, re-
pugnant to the equal protection clause of the Indian Civil Rights
Act.6 2
Another memorandum of the Department concerned the Black-
feet ordinance requiring that applications for tribal enrollment be
filed within one year of birth. The Assistant Solicitor of Indian Legal
Activities stated that the strict requirement, without provision for
exception due to "error or disability," "may well" violate the due
process clause of the Civil Rights Act.6 3 He then recommended that
the ordinance be amended. While tribal ordinances have always
been subject to Secretarial approval,64 the standards for such ap-
proval will now be much stricter. At any rate, it seems anomalous
that a tribe, which is considered as a semisovereign entity, should
have to submit its proposed ordinances to the Secretary for his ap-
proval.
60. Brief of United States in support of motion to dismiss, at 4, Hein v. Nicholson,
Civil No. 3459 (E.D. Wash., Nov. 30, 1971).
61. Id.
62. Op. Dep. Sol., M-36793, 76 I.D. 353 (1969).
63. Memo. Ass't SoL (March 11, 1969) (emphasis added).
In a letter of the Assistant Secretary (Feb. 25, 1971) the Shoshone Business
Council Enrollment Ordinance No. 8(1-b), which provides that "[Tlhe father of the
applicant must be an Indian and at least one parent of the applicant must be an enrolled
member of the Shoshone Indian Tribe," was disapproved as violative of the equal pro-
tection provision of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) since it prohibited the enrollment of a child of a
Shoshone woman and a non-Indian, but allowed the enrollznent of a child of a Shoshone
man and a non-Indian woman. But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), reh den.,
402 U.S. 990 (1971).
64. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
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The Department has, however, decided that a tribal ordinance
which prohibits all aerial crop spraying withirA the confines of the
Fort Hall Indian Reservation is not in violation of the due process
requirement of the Act. The Assistant Secretary of the Interior up-
held the ordinance "as being prohibitory rather than regulatory,"
and found "no reason to differ with the policy decision made by the
tribes." 65 For purposes of ascertaining whether there has been a
denial of due process, this distinction is secondary to the effect on
the person or thing regulated.
If followed, the policy decisions made by the tribes will be con-
trolling only when they happen to coincide with an Anglo policy de-
cision. Thus, the "internal affairs" exception, a judicially-created
doctrine of self-restraint, has fallen victim to a policy of Congres-
sional intervention as expressly articulated by the Act.
II. THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF THE TRIBE 66
The preceding analysis pertains only to subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. Jurisdiction over the person will involve the bringing of an In-
dian tribe before a court of law, and this raises the issue of tribal
immunity.
A. Indian Tribes are Immune from Suit In the Absence of Con-
gressional Consent
As sovereign dependent nations, American Indian tribes, sub-
ject to the plenary power of Congress, are immune from suit in any
court unless Congress has expressly consented to the suit. This prin-
ciple was well established by 1895.7
The civilized Nations in the Indian Territory are probably
better guarded against oppression from this source [suits
by individuals] than the states themselves, for the states
may consent to be sued, but the United States has never
given its permission that these Indian Nations might be sued
generally, even with their consent."8
This principle was reaffirmed as recently as 1967 in Twin Cities
65. Memo. Ass't. Secretary, M-36836, 78 I.D. 229 (April 19, 1971); Op. Sol. M-36840.
The Eighteen-Year-Old Vote Amendment as Applied to [Indian Tribes (Nov. 9, 1971)
is one of the few examples of an attempt to strike a balance between the "internal"
affairs of the tribe and other activities considered external. Here, Section I of the 26th
Amendment was stated to apply to tribal elections called by the Secretary of the Interior
pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act or other federal acts, but it was held not to
apply to Indian tribes in purely tribal elections.
66. This section is based largely on S. Bobo Dean's Brief for the Association on
American Indians as Amicus Curiae, Joshua v. Goodhouse, Civil No. 4469 (D. N.D.,
April 17, 1971).
67. Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895).
68. Id. at 376.
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Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe,69 a case
which involved the validity of a tribal election held for the purpose
of amending a tribal constitution and bylaws pursuant to the Fed-
eral Indian Reorganization Act.7 0 In upholding the dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff's claim of
"federal question" jurisdiction,7 1 stating:
This argument overlooks defendant Minnesota Chippewa
Tribe's sovereign immunity, protecting it from suit in the
federal courts. Indian tribes under the tutelage of the United
States are not subject to suit without the consent of Congress
:. . and 28 U.S.C. §1331 does not operate to waive sovereign
immunity .... "72
The result is the same even where the Indian Reorganization
Act (IRA) is not involved. In Green v. Wilson,71 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a tribe was immune from suit where the
plaintiff challenged the validity of a tribal constitution adopted and
approved under federal authority and regulations issued thereun-
der.74 Thus, the courts have recognized the immunity of non-IRA
tribes, as well as IRA tribes, in these suits.
Finally, this result is not changed under the "federal instrumen-
tality" theory as articulated in Colliflower v. Garland75 . In Joshua v.
Goodhouse,76 the plaintiff requested a declaratory judgment that
the amendment to the constitution and bylaws of the Devils Lake
Sioux Tribe be declared null and void, and, in addition, requested
an injunction against any further action by defendant, Thomas Siaka,
as chief judge of the tribe.77 The defendant, as chief judge of the
Devils Lake Sioux Tribal Court, was an employee of the United
States, being employed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.7 8 In its
Order of Dismissal, the court stated that "[t]he United States has
not consented to suit herein and has appropriately claimed sover-
eign immunity in asserting a defense of its employee, Thomas
Siaka. ' ' 79 It is submitted that in this last situation where the defend-
ant would be covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act,8 0 if it were
69. 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967).
70. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
71. 25 U.S.C. 9 476 (1970) ; 28 U.S.C. 9 1331 (1970).
72. Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 b'.2d 529,
531 (8th Cir. 1967).
73. 331 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1964).
74. 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
75. 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
76. Civil No. 4469 (D. N.D., April 17, 1971).
77. Complaint for Plaintiff, at 4, Joshua v. Goodhouse, Civil No. 4469 (D. N.D., April
17, 1971)
78. Joshua v. Goodhouse, Civil No. 4469, at 1 (D. N.D., Judgment of dismissal, Dec.
11, 1970).
79. Id. at 2.
80. 28 U.S.C. §9 2671 et eeq. (1970).
705
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
to be applied,8 the United States should be precluded from claim-
ing immunity.
B. Enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act Does Not Constitute
Consent to Suit
The passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act does not constitute
Congressional consent to suits against the tribes. The impact of the
Act on the doctrine of immunity has been considered in several
cases.8 2 In Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe 3 the court concluded
that it had jurisdiction over the defendant tribe in a suit to enforce
rights claimed under the Act. It reached this result by applying
the federal provision84 giving the district courts jurisdiction of civil
actions instituted for the protection of civil rights discussed above.
The court also concedes, however, that the opinion ". . . intimates
nothing with respect to the doctrine of judicial immunity, nor official
immunity from suit. ' 85 Hence, the court does not conclude that
the Indian Civil Rights Act, together with civil rights original juris-
dictions constitutes Congressional consent to suit against Indian
tribes. Even a very liberal reading of the section suggests no broader
interpretation than that the district courts were to be given juris-
diction over the subject matter of such suits. It may well be that
in the cases decided under the Act, the distinction between subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction was overlooked.
In the latest case which discusses immunity, Longcassion v.
Leekity, 7 the court conceded that there was no express waiver of
immunity in the Act itself, but asserted that the waiver must be im-
plied since to hold otherwise would render the Act "an unenforce-
able admonition." ' s This pronouncement, not supported in the de-
cision by cases or legislative history, was not essential to the out-
come of the case. The Zuni Pueblo had expressly waived its im-
munity by the terms of an agreement between it and the Bureau of
Indian Affairs; in addition to which, the court expressly refused to
81. See Halle v. Saunooke, 246 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1957). Plaintiffs, Injured when a
bridge, located on the reservation and maintained by the tribe, collapsed, sought re-
covery from the Individual Indian operators, the Indian tribe and the United States in
Its capacity as trustee and guardian of the tribe. In dismissing the action because the
Federal Tort Claims Act did not authorize such a suit, the court noted that plaintiffs
might recover under the Act ". . . if they can show damages resulting from any negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the government acting within the
scope of his office or employment." Id. at 298.
82. Pinnow v. Shoshone Tribal Council, 314 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Wyo. 1970), aff'd sub.
nom., Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971) ; Loncasslon v.'
Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D. N.M. 1971) ; Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp.
85 (D. Mont. 1969).
83. 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
85. 301 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D. Mont. 1969).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
87. Loncasslon v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D. N.M. 1971).
88. Id. at 373.
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decide whether the claim would have been sustainable under the
Act. 19
The Indian Civil Rights Act itself mentions nothing in regard to
tribal immunity, and as stated in Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of In-
dians: 90
The intention of Congress to confer such a jurisdiction [tak-
ing away tribal immunity] upon any court would have to
be expressed in plain and unambiguous terms.91
The one established exception to the doctrine of immunity is that
while an employee acting within the scope of his employment may
not be sued,92 the officer may be sued as an individual, for commis-
sion of a tort, if he acts outside the scope of his authority.9 There-
fore, in suits brought pursuant to the Act, the defendant must have
acted outside the scope of his authority.
In summary, since the immunity of the tribe exists only at the
caprice of Congress, any consistent judicial interpretation of the Act
as limited by tribal immunity, could result in a congressional amend-
ment to the Act waiving this defense, and rendering this discussioi
moot. However, the same considerations which motivated Congress.
to reverse its prior termination policy 94 and demand tribal consent
as a condition precedent to state assumption of jurisdiction over the
reservations 95 suggests that perhaps tribal consent is also appro-
priate here.
III. DECLARATORY RELIEF UNDER THE ACT
A. The Appropriateness of the Relief
The Declaratory Judgment Act 9  empowers any federal court,
when presented with an actual controversy over which it has juris-
diction, to "declare the rights and other legal relations of any inter-
ested party seeking such declaration." However, the Declaratory
Judgment Act itself creates no jurisdiction.9 7 Moore states:
89. Id. at 375, n. 8.
90. 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895).
91. Id. at 376.
92. Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) ; Davis v. Littell, 398 F.2d 83 (9th Cr. 1968).
93. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
94. See e.g., Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 1, 27 Stat. 635 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 1
283 (1970) ).
95. Act of August 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970) :
In a case of actual controversy within its Jurisdiction, except with
respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing
of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations
of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further
relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and
effect of a final Judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
97. Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 1971).
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It is not alone sufficient that a justiciable controversy be
present; plaintiff must fit his case within one of the juris-
dictional statutes.
9 8
Recently the Second,9 9 Fourth'0 0 and Sixth Circuits' 01 have found
jurisdiction, under provisions granting the federal courts original
jurisdiction,'10 2 a sufficient jurisdictional basis for granting declara-
tory relief in certain civil rights cases.
Three cases have considered declaratory relief under the De-
claratory Judgment Act. 1 3 In Dodge v. Nakai,'10 4 although neither the
plaintiffs nor the court specifically mentioned the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, in addition to damages the plaintiffs sought "such fur-
ther relief as to the court may seem appropriate.' 1 5 The court re-
sponded by declaring "that the August 8th order constitutes an un-
lawful bill of attainder."' 09 The situation is Spotted Eagle v. Black-
feet Tribe0 7 and Lefthand v. Crow Tribal Council'0 8 is more elucidat-
ing. Plaintiffs in the former case had asked the court for a judgment
which would, inter alia, "3. Nullify the Law and Order Code of
the Blackfeet Tribe."' 0 9 The opinion, speaking only of subject matter
jurisdiction, (the case was settled out of court when the tribe con-
structed a new jail containing facilities for the treatment of alcohol-
ics), stated:
The court does have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. §1343 (4)
where an Indian claims damages and equitable relief as a-
gainst the Indian tribe and officers of the tribe ... 110
In Lefthand, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment concerning
alleged irregularities in the tribal government. Citing Spotted Eagle,
the court agreed that "it may fashion an equitable remedy where
[a] right exists.""' The action was dismissed, however, the court
finding that the equities did not militate in favor of a remedy and
that the case did not clearly present the interests of the plaintiff
and defendant as being adverse. 1 2 Significantly, each case found
98. 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 3135 (2d ed. 1971).
99. Hull v. Petrillo, 439 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir. 1971).
100. Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1003 (1971).
101. Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
103. Lefthand v. Crow Tribal Council, 329 F. Supp. 728 (D. Mont. 1971): Spotted
Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969) ; Dodge v. Nakal, 298 F. Supp.
26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
104. 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
105. Id. at 28.
106. Id. at 34.
107. 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969).
108. 829 F. Supp. 728 (D. Mont. 1971).
109. Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85, 87 (D. Mont. 1969).
110. Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
111. Lefthand v. Crow Tribal Council, 329 F. Supp. 728, 731 (D. Mont. 1971).
112. 1d.
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subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1343 (4), the civil rights-
jurisdictional statute.
It is submitted that the remedy of declaratory relief is particu-
larly appropriate to maintaining tribal autonomy while, at the same
time, protecting federally guaranteed rights. Absent access to the
federal courts, tribal judges, frequently lacking in either formal le-
gal education or the assistance of professional counsel, 11 would be
confronted with the task of construing some of the most complex
clauses of the Constitution. Alternatively, if the federal courts mani-
pulate the tribal justice system through the unrestrained exercise
of their injunctive power, 114 the effect would be to leave the tribal
courts the most subservient of federal instrumentalities. Such action
would frustrate Congressional intent:
Discussion of the Indian Bill of Rights showed no intent to
use the statute as an instrument for modifying tribal cultural
attitudes in order to facilitate assimilation of Indians into
the non-Indian community. In fact, the committee showed
a positive intent to avoid requirements injurious to the tribes'
capacity to function as autonomous governmental units.
15
The goal of preservation of tribal autonomy received endorse-
ment most recently in Kills Crow v. United States"6 where the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to give a lesser-
included-offense instruction in a prosecution under the Major Crimes
Act.1 17 Although the opinion articulated multiple rationles, the court
specifically noted that the requested instruction, by incorporating
offenses not within the Act, would have the effect of eroding the
criminal jurisdiction of the tribal courts.
Furthermore, the use of declaratory relief seems most amen-
able to the educating function of the tribal courts as set forth in
United States v. Clapox: 1 8
These "courts of Indian offfefnses" are . . . mere educa-
tional and disciplinary instrumentalities, by which the gov-
ernment of the United States is endeavoring to improve and
elevate the condition of these dependent tribes to whom it
whom it sustains the relation of guardian. 19
Although Clapox speaks from another era, today it could be read
as describing the position of the tribal court as somewhere between
113. M. PRICE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INDIAN LAW 191-192 (Mimeo. ed. 1971).
114. See notes 147-217 and accompanying text, infra.
115. HARV. COMM., at 1359.
116. 451 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1971).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
118. 35 F. 675 (D. Ore. 1888).
119. Id. at 577.
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the federal concern for procedural due process and civil rights and
the tribal tradition of customary, informal justice.
12 0
Declaratory relief, judiciously applied, can serve the ends of
both the federal and tribal systems. Through this vehicle, fine points
of law can be settled where judicial professionalism is at its maxi-
mum-in the federal courts. The federal courts' declaration of rights
then leaves the tribal judge, sensitive to his dual responsibilities,
free to mold that declaration in such a way that it becomes a part
of the tribal justice system with a minimum of disruption to tribal
tradition. Within this context, current developments in the area of
declaratory relief will be reviewed.
B. The Impact of Younger v .Harris
The first question to be confronted is the limitation placed on
declaratory relief by Younger v. Harris,12 1 a case in which the plain-
tiffs sought both injunctive and declaratory relief against a state
criminal prosecution. Although denying both declaratory and in-
junctive relief in the case presented, the Supreme Court stated:
We express no view about the circumstances under which
federal courts may act when there is no prosecution pending
in state courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun.
1 22
In Zwickler v. Koota123 a case not mentioned in the Younger
opinion, the Supreme Court reversed a dismissal by the district
court of plaintiff's plea for injunctive and declaratory relief against
a state statute prohibiting the dissemination of anonymous cam-
paign literature. The district court had dismissed because it had
determined that injunctive relief was not -available. The Court said:
We hold that a federal district court has the duty to decide
the appropriateness and the merits of the declaratory request
irrespective of its conclusion as to the propriety of the is-
suance of the injunction.124
The Zwickler case was cited with approval by the Supreme
Court in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,125 a case holding abstention im-
proper where the challenged statute was not demonstrably vague,
and the only interest served would be to await decision by a state
court. Thus, where the state proceeding has not commenced, re-
120. Shepardson, Problems of the Navajo Tribal Courts in Transition, 24 HUMAN OR-
OANIZATIONS 250 (1965).
121. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
122. Id. at 41.
123. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
124. Id. at 254.
125. 400 U.S. 438 (1971).
NoTEs
gardless of the propriety of an injunction, declaratory relief appears
to be available.
One limitation upon this kind of relief is that a declaratory judg-
ment cannot be used to secure mere advisory opinions.122 It is sub-
mitted that when federal courts are presented with petitions for de-
clarations of rights arising under the Act, they should consider de-
velopments in state-federal civil rights controversies as a source of
doctrines applicable by analogy. In addition, the federal courts
should adopt a standard of liberality in granting the declaratory re-
lief where the alternative remedies would result in a greater im-
pingement on tribal sovereignty; this remedy should be encouraged
by a permissive standard of exigent adversity.
C. The Doctrines of Exhaustion and Abstention
Declaratory relief need not be an exclusive remedy, and may
be considered whether or not "other forms of relief are appropri-
ate."' 2 7 Speaking of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Supreme Court in
Katzenbach v. McClung 12  suggested a circumstance wherein a
lack of exclusivity would bar declaratory relief:
But even though rule 57 . . . permits declaratory relief al-
though another adequate remedy exists, it should not be
granted where a special statutory proceeding has been pro-
vided.22
9
The Court noted that the 1964 Act provided a statutory proceeding
for determining rights and duties arising thereunder. By a parity of
reasoning McClung militates against a similar restriction on declar-
atory relief under the Act, for it provides no such means for ad-
judicating rights and duties; habeas corpus was not designed for
this purpose.
Exhaustion of state remedies has not been held to be a condi-
tion precedent to declaratory relief in civil rights cases. In Moreno
v. Henckel 80 the court said:
The district court not only abstained, but dismissed the com-
plaint on the ground that a remedy was available to the
plaintiffs in the Texas courts. That is not the law. "The fact
that a state remedy is available is not a valid basis for federal
court abstention."' 3'
126. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Poe v. Uflman, 367 U.S.
497 (1961).
127. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969).
128. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
129. Id. at 296.
130. 431 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970).
131. Id. at 1300.
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Few cases draw a clear line between exhaustion and abstention. Ex-
haustion has been held not to be a prerequisite to action under two
federal statutes.13 2 In another district court case, failure to exhaust
state judicial or administrative remedies was not found to consti-
tute a jurisdictional barrier. 183
A litigant must normally exhaust state "legislative" or "ad-
ministrative" remedies before challenging the state action
in federal court. He need not normally exhaust state "judi-
cial" remedies.
n.6: However, where plaintiff is suing for a deprivation
of civil rights, under 28 U. S. C.A §1343, and his claim is
based entirely on federal law, he need not exhaust even state
"administrative" remedies. 3 4
he reason behind this policy has been recently stated by the Second
Circuit, "[w]here the civil rights complaint is framed in terms of
facial unconstitutionality, courts have held exhaustion inapplicable
since accelerated relief is the essence of the action.'
' 3
5
Abstention is similarly disfavored in civil rights cases.1 6 The
Supreme Court in Zwickler stated:
[W]e again emphasized that abstention cannot be ordered
simply to give state courts the first opportunity to vindicate
the federal claim. After examining the purpose of the Civil
Rights Act, under which that action was brought, we conclud-
ed that "[w]e would defeat those purposes if we held that
assertion of a federal claim in a federal court must await
an attempt to vindicate that same claim in a state court."
For the "recognition of the role of state courts as the final
expositors of state law implies no disregard for the primacy
of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of federallaw.',t137
The Zwickler case's condemnation of abstention was quoted with
approval by the Court in 1971, "[w]here there is no ambiquity in
the state statute. .. ."131 This language is suggestive of the propriety
of abstention where "answers to questions concerning unclear
state law may well be dispositve of [the] controversy.' 3 9
Despite this disfavor of exhaustion and abstention, it has been
182. Payne v. Whitmore, 325 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970) ).
183. Karr v. Schmidt, 820 F. Supp. 728 (W.D. Tex. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 930
(1971).
134. C. WRiaHT, FDxERAL COURTS 187 (2d ed. 1970).
135. Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 461 (2d Cir. 1971).
186. Moreno v. Henckel, 431 F.2d 1299, 1301 (5th Cir. 1970).
137. 389 U.S. 241, 251 (1967).
188. Wis. v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971).
139. Hill v. Victoria County Drainage District No. 3, 441 F.2d 416, 417 (5th Cir. 1971)
accord, Miller v. Miller, 423 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1971).
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held that, "[w]here habeas corpus is an available remedy, it be-
comes unnecessary to consider whether declaratory relief may be
granted." 140 Thus, although a plaintiff may allege a denial of civil
rights under the Act, he will be unlikely to receive declaratory relief
if he has a remedy under the Act's habeas corpus provision.141 The
significance of this exception was enhanced by Settler v. Lameer142
which held that habeas corpus 143 would be available to test the legal-
ity of detention by the tribe even where the defendant had paid a
fine and was released.
If the applicability of exhaustion or abstention to civil rights
cases depends upon the readiness of state courts to construe the
statute in order to avoid the constitutional issue, then the doctrines
are particularly applicable where the tribal court stands in the shoes
of the state court because no limiting construction may be possible.
In Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court,144 because the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior was necessary before the tribal code could
be changed, the court concluded that the tribal court system could
not be modified without federal consent. The only other case arising
under the Act which takes a position on the requirement of exhaus-
tion of tribal remedies is Dodge v. Nakai.14 5 Although the court
heard the case despite plaintiffs' failure to exhaust tribal remedies,
it noted that under other circumstances it would "require plain-
tiffs to exhaust remedies available within the tribal government
framework. . . ." . The reasons articulated in Dodge for requiring
exhaustion reflect the "internal affairs" limitation and respect for
the independence of the tribal courts. While the doctrines of absten-
tion and exhaustion will be appropriate under some circumstances,
it is submitted that both precedent and the unique character of the
tribal system militate against the use of these doctrines as a bar
to obtaining declaratory relief. Thus, when presented with a petition
for declaratory relief by a plaintiff faced with at least probable
adversity, a federal court should consider its superiority over the
tribal justice system in terms of judicial professionalism as a com-
pelling reason for hearing the case. In this way, the court may ef-
fectuate Congressional policy fostering an independent tribal justice
system by articulating its declaration of rights in sufficiently flexible
140. Pruitt v. Campbell, 429 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1970); Rulp v. Kentucky, 400 F.2d 871
(6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 911 (1969).
141. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
142. 419 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1969).
143. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
144. 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969). The court's point is well taken. An examination
of tribal constitutions revealed only one---the Isleta Pueblo-specifically authorizing the
tribal court to overrule actions of the tribal council. The tribal courts do not function
within a framework of checks and balances or separation of powers. Interview with Mr.
Jack D. Ross, Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, Indian Civil Rights
Task Force, March 26, 1972.
145. 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ark. 1968).
146. Id. at 26.
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terms so as to permit its application as precedent on the reservation
without destroying the tribal tradition of customary, informal justice.
IV. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AS AN EQUITABLE REMEDY
A. Injunctive Relief as Applied to Judicial Officers
Injunctions have been issued under the Act enjoining the enforce-
ment of an exclusion order,14 7 interference with access to the tribal
administration, 148 and further proceeding of the tribal court until
the defendants were permitted to retain professional counsel. 149
Since the Act proscribes interference by the tribe with the rights
guaranteed thereunder, it is probable that equitable relief will be
most frequently sought against tribal officers, particularly judges
and policemen. Federal interference with state court proceedings
is limited by the Anti-Injunction Act, 150 prohibiting injunctions
except where expressly authorized by statute in order to protect
jurisdiction or to effectuate its judgments. No case has applied
the Anti-Injunction Statute to the tribal courts. The Ninth Circuit
twice considered the applicability of the act to the territorial courts
of Hawaii, and both times failed to reach the question.
1 52
However, without applying the statute, the Supreme Court dis-
cussed deference to territorial courts in Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke
Lok Po, 5 8 an action seeking an injunction against the compulsory
teaching of a foreign language in the Hawaiian public schools:
Entirely aside from the question of the propriety of an in-
junction in any court, territorial like state courts are the
natural sources for the interpretation and application of the
acts of their legislatures and equally of the propriety of inter-
ference by injunction. We think that where equitable inter-
ference with state and territorial acts is sought in federal
courts, judicial consideration of acts of importance primarily
to the people of a state or territory should, as a matter of
147. Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
148. Wasson v. Gray, Civil No. 9223 (D. N.M., Nov 18, 1971) (temporary restraining
order granted) ; Claw v. Armstrong, Civil Action No. C-2307 (D. Colo., Sept. 16, 1970)
Reagan v. Blackfeet Tribal Court, Civil No. 2850 (D. Mont., July 7, 1969).
149. Towersap v. Fort Hall Tribal Court, Civil No. 4-70-37 (D. Idaho, Dec. 28, 1971).
See Solomon v. LaRose, 335 F. Supp. 715 (D. Neb. 1971) (temporary injunction granted,
the court finding that it was probable that the tribal council had exceeded its authority
In excluding plaintiffs, elected members of the council, and had hence denied thorn due
process).
150. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970):
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings In a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Con-
gress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its Judgments.
151. A tribe is not a "state" within the language of the Constitution. Worcester v.
Ga., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
152. Ackerman v. International Longshoreman's & Warehouseman's Union, 187 F.2d
860 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1953) ; Alesna v. Rice, 172 F.2d 176
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 841 (1949).
153. 336 U.S. 868 (1949).
discretion, be left by the federal courts to the courts of the
legislating authority unless exceptional circumstances com-
mand a different course.2
5 '
This language was quoted with approval in Ackerman v. Inter-
national Longshoreman's & Warehousemen's Union,155 where the
court refused to enjoin a criminal prosecution by Hawaiian officers.
Assuming that by virtue of its appearance in Ackerman, the Supreme
Court's language applies to the enjoining of a prosecution, it presents
criteria with which to weigh this remedy with regard to the tribal
courts.
In Younger v. Harris'58 the Supreme Court applied the Anti-
Injunction Statute to reverse a lower court's order granting an
injunction against prosecution under a statute arguably unconstitu-
tional on its face. 57 The court went to some length to limit Dom-
browski v. Pfister"s8 which had liberalized the standards for the
enjoining of state court prosecutions on constitutional grounds. In
addition to the Anti-Injunction Statue,159 the court relied on the
traditional equitable requirements of an inadequate remedy at law
and irreparable injury. The Court demanded sensitivity to the inter-
ests of both state and national governments. 160 In articulating stan-
dards for intervention, the Court noted:
Certain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety and
inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal
prosecution, could not by themselves be considered "irrep-
arable" in the special legal sense of that term.161
Even assuming the inadequacy of the tribal court system to
assert a federal right under the Act in a manner requiring the
narrowing or voiding of tribal council action, the reasoning of
Younger still militates against federal injunctive interference with
tribal court prosecutions. The emphasis in Younger on disabilities
common to the "single criminal prosecution" is inescapable. Even
in circumstances where the defendant might prevail because of a
state statute's prima facie unconstitutionality, practicality dictates
disabilities beyond those of a "single criminal prosecution," because
few state courts of general criminal jurisdiction are in the habit
of settling constitutional questions. Thus, the defendant will in all
likelihood content himself with laying a constitutional basis for
154. Id. at 383-384 (citations omitted).
155. 187 F.2d 860, 868-869 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1953).
156. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
157. Id.
158. 880 U.S. 479 (1965).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
160. Younger V. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
161. Id. at 46.
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appellate review as he shoulders the burden of the single prose-
cution.
The defendant before a tribal court is in a similar position.
The disabilities borne by both state and tribal courts at the first
level are not distinguishable. And although the state court defendant
has assurance of a state appellate court to hear constitutional
arguments, the tribal court defendant, despite the absence of a
like body in the tribal justice system, can move to the federal sys-
tem either by virtue of habeas corpus or on jurisdiction based on
certain civil rights controversies.
18 2
The discussion of comity by the Court in Younger also supports
this argument, as "the National Government will fare best if the
States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways."' 163 The tribes have, even more
clearly than the individual states, an interest in dispensing justice
unique in form if not in content. This interest will be best served
if the limitations of Younger operate to protect a tribal court from
federal injunctive intervention. Furthermore, the very imposition
of basic Anglo-American standards of procedural due process is
an attempt to enhance their stature within the judicial hierarchy.
How, then, should a federal court respond to the admittedly
real danger that a tribal court, because of its limited professionalism,
will be both unable and unwilling to resolve matters of federal
right? Although Younger holds that a declaratory judgment against
a statute involved in a pending prosecution is also inappropriate,8 4
it is suggested that the distinction in expertise between the tribal
and state courts favors this remedy. If a defendant in a pending
tribal prosecution is permitted to seek declaratory relief before
a federal court, and his claim is found to be meritorious, he will
return to the tribal proceeding with a declaration of that right.
Meanwhile, the tribal court is not as completely powerless as it
would be if the proceeding had been enjoined. The tribal system
has not been forced to an ignominious halt. Behind the gloss of
the tribal court, informal societal pressures may still work to achieve
a result more consistent with tradition. Finally, if the tribal court
exercises its remaining discretion in such a way as to produce an
egregious violation of federal rights, the fined or incarcerated de-
fendant retains his access to the federal system through the habeas
corpus provisions of the Act and through the federal court's civil
righfs jurisdiction. 165 This procedure is submitted as a maximization
of tribal autonomy with a minimum of disability to the defendant,
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
163. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
164. Id. at 41, n. 2.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1843(4) (1970).
really no different than that suffered by the state criminal defendant
as restricted by Younger.
Whatever flexibility remains for the tribal court to decide a
case where one of the parties has secured a federal declaration
of his rights, the impact on the tribal judicial officials is significantly
reduced if injunctions are not issued against them. As between the
parties, the declaratory judgment is res judicata. And although a
tribal court ignoring the federal declaration risks nearly certain re-
versal, the force of the federal declaration is that of stare decisis.
Thus the prosecutor remains free to bring, and the court free to
hear the action, although had an injunction been issued, officers
all along the judicial system would risk contempt and imprisonment
for so acting. Thus not only has the prestige of the tribal court
been spared by limiting relief to a declaration, but also the contro-
versy may then be resolved through traditional influences.
Apart from the limitation in Younger on enjoining state criminal
proceedings, no other doctrinal obstacles remain in the way of in-
junctive relief for civil rights violations. Although in Monroe v.
Pape166 and Pierson v. Ray' 67 the Supreme Court held municipalities
and judges respectively to be immune from damages in civil rights
cases, immunity is inapplicable to the injunctive remedy. In Koen
v. Lang168 the Court distinguished Pierson:
Defendants cite no case in which the common law doctrine
of judicial immunity, as discussed in Pierson, has been ex-
tended to suits requesting purely equitable relief. Indeed, the
very rationale of the Pierson decision stands against them.
Indeed, in the history of the common law, judges and other
quasi-judicial officers have been held subject to equitable and
quasi-equitable actions - for example, writs of mandamus
and prohibition. 169
However, in Joshua v. Goodhouse, 70 plaintiff sought inter alia,
an injunction against defendant tribal judge prohibiting his enforce-
ment of an amendment to the tribal constitution. In granting de-
fendant's motion to dismiss, the court stated that defendant Siaka,
as chief judge of the Devils Lake Sioux Tribal Court, was entitled
to judicial immunity for acts performed in good faith in his capacity
as chief judge."". This result, in the context of injunctive relief
166. 865 U.S. 167 (1961).
167. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
168. 302 F. Supp. 1383 (E.D. Mo. 1969), aff'd, 428 F.2d 876 (8th Cir. 1970), Cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
169. Id. at 1887; accord, Hadnott v. Ames, 394 U.S. 358 (1969).
170. Civil No. 4469 (D. N.D., April 17, 1971).
171. Joshua v. Goodhouse, Civil No. 4469 (D. N.D., Judgment of Dismissal, Dec. 11,
1970).
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as distinguished from damages, seems to be unsupported by the
rationale of Koen. The consequences of injunctive relief are no
more egregious than those of consistent appellate reversal.
B. Injunctive Relief as Applied to Non-Judicial Officers
The officials subject to injunctive remedies include the prosecut-
ing attorney and the police commissioner. 7 2 State and federal police
have been a consistent target of equitable actions, the most notable
case being Lankford v. Gelston,7 8 where the Baltimore police had
conducted more than three hundred illegal searches of homes in
the black district within a nineteen day period. Further searches
of the property of the plaintiffs and those similarly situated based
on uncorroborated anonymous tips were enjoined. Injunctions have
been issued against police brutality,'174 seizures without a prior hear-
ing,'17  and coercion of persons with physical similarities to that
of the suspect in order to fill-in lineups. 17 6 The availability of equitable
relief against police abuse, particularly in the area of search and
seizure, is significant in redressing similar rights under the Act.
Although, as has been suggested, an initial declaration of rights
would maximize tribal autonomy, where, as in Lankford, the abuse
is in accord with a routine practice and plan conceived by high
officials, ample precedent supports injunctive relief by analogy to
the state-federal relationship. Nor does the tribe's status as a sov-
ereign appear to create any immunity from injunctive relief. In
suits under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,17 cities 7 8 and municipal
corporations have been held to be proper parties. 7 9 The investigation
of a state legislative committee has been found to be within the
equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts.8 0
C. Summary of Injunctive Relief Under the Act
Federal injunctive interference in state criminal prosecutions
has been greatly restricted by the Supreme Court's application
172. Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1970).
178. 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
174. Hairston v. Hutzler, 10 Crim. L. Rptr. 2189 (W.D. Pa., Nov. 18, 1971).
175. Leslie Tobin Imports, Inc. v. Rizzo, 305 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
176. Butcher v. Rizzo, 317 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be sub-
Jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the Juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
178. Schell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969).
179. Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1970); Service Employees
International Union, AFL-CIO v. County of Butler, Pa., 306 F. Supp. 1080 (W.D. Pa.
969).
180. Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963). Whatever the immunity held
by the government entity, the rationale of suing the entity's agent as an individual pre-
serves a cause of action. Ew parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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of the Anti-Injunction Statute in Younger v. Harris.'8 ' No case
has held the tribal courts to be within the ambit of this statute.
The Court's reasoning in Younger, however, would not distinguish
between the disabilities suffered by the state defendant in a single
prosecution as opposed to the tribal defendant. Each must expect
to prevail on the statute's prima facie unconstitutionality before
a higher tribunal. Furthermore, the Court's discussion of comity
analogously supports deference to the tribe's interest in preserving
a unique justice system. It is submitted that this interest can
be furthered only if federal courts refuse to enjoin tribal court
proceedings, but at the same time agree to enter declaratory judg-
ments where facts of particular exigency demand relief. Outside
the realm of criminal prosecutions, ample precedent within the
state-federal sphere upholds the propriety of injunctive relief
against judicial and non-judicial officers. Since neither sovereign
nor judicial immunity has been successfully asserted as a defense
against an injunction, arguably, tribal immunity would not preclude
the granting of injunctive relief.
V. RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE ACT
A. The Damage Remedy as Applied to the Tribe
Federal district courts have twice considered whether damages
are recoverable from the tribe for violations of the Act. l82 Relying
on Jones v. Mayer, 83 the court in' Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet
Tribe18 4 found civil rights jurisdiction 85 but broke new ground by
determining damages under that jurisdiction. Federal district courts
are given jurisdiction over civil actions authorized by law to be
commenced by any person for the protection of civil rights.8 8 While
the court noted that it had pendent jurisdiction over the damage
claims against the officers as individuals, it indicated that the
damage claims would not arise from the Civil Rights Act itself, 87
and that the substantive source of the right to damages was, in fact,
uncertain:
181. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
182. Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D. N.M. 1971); Spotted Eagle v. Black-
feet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969).
183. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
184. 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969). Because the court found itself confronted by a
statute providing neither for remedies nor Jurisdiction, it relied on the Supreme Court's
treatment of 42 U.S.C. § 1982-a statute similar on both points-in the Jones case. Al-
though in Jones the Court left open the question of an implied right to damages, in a
later case arising under § 1982 it awarded damages. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,
396 U.S. 229 (1969).
185. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
186. Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D. Mont. 1969).
187. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302 et seq. (1970).
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In Bell v. Hood . . . the district court held that the right to
damages for the unlawful search, etc., was a common law
right arising out of state law. If this case should ever go so
far an interesting problem would arise as to the source of
any law giving plaintiffs a right to damages as against the
tribe or its officers.
1 88
Spotted Eagle is distinguishable, however, since the court in Jones
failed to reach the issue of an implied damage remedy under the
jurisdictional provision.18 9 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Bureau of Narcotics,190 where the Supreme Court held that
there was an implied right to damages, had yet to be decided.
In the other damage case decided under the Act, Loncassion
v. Leekity,192 the plaintiff sued the Zuni Pueblo for injuries suffered
when a tribal policeman allegedly acted negligently in shooting the
plaintiff, a minor, when he sought to escape arrest for being drunk.
The court found jurisdiction, 193 citing Spotted Eagle to support the
argument that the asserted violation of rights created by the Act
was a claim arising under the laws of the United States. 194 Noting
the similarity between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and sec-
tions of the Act,195 the court held that damages were recoverable
under the Act based on the Supreme Court's treatment of Fourth
Amendment violations in Bell v. Hood and Bivens. The court quoted
the Bell case:
[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it
has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert
to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.
96
As to subject matter jurisdiction including a damage remedy,
the court's reliance appears to be soundly placed. In Bivens, the
Supreme Court reversed the district court's finding that it lacked
jurisdiction over a damage claim against federal officers for an
allegedly unlawul search. Although the Court acknowledged that
the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for
enforcement through an award of money damages as a consequence
of its violation,'197 it stated that its creation of a damage remedy,
"should hardly seem a surprising proposition"'' 98 in light of the
188. Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85, 91, n. 16 (D. Mont. 1969).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
190. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
191. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
192. 334 F. Supp. 370 (D. N.M. 1971).
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970)
194. Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370, 372 (D. N.M. 1971)
195. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2), (8) (1970)
196. Loncasslon v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370, 374 (D. N.M. 1971)
197. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
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historical availability of damages for invasions of personal interests
in liberty.
The Loncassion court attempted to settle the question of personal
jurisdiction over the tribe which was left open in Spotted Eagle.
The court attributes the tribe's exemption from suit to a congres-
sional attempt to preserve tribal self-government and cultural auton-
omy. While conceding that "[t]he Act does not, in so many words,
provide that a tribe may be sued under its provisions nor does it
explicitly waive sovereign immunity as a defense,"'199 the court con-
cludes that "to hold otherwise would render the Act an unenforce-
able admonition. ' ' 20 0 However, this pronouncement is not dispositive
of tribal immunity under the Act.
This analysis of tribal immunity in a case arising under the
Act constitutes a departure from clear precedent and is based
on unsound reasoning. An equally well established corollary of tribal
immunity is the requirement of express congressional waiver, de-
manding the construction of ambiguous terms in the tribe's favor.
20 1
No such language appears on the face of the Act or in its legislative
history; 20 2 nor can the Bivens case, despite its strong assertion
of remedies for violation of federal rights, be considered as dis-
positive of the issue. Although noting that official immunity had
been relied on by the lower court, the Supreme Court expressly
refused to consider the issue.
0 3
Furthermore, a construction of the Act as a waiver, justified
by the necessity of remedies, ignores both the operation of equitable
remedies, and, more importantly, the possibilities for both compen-
sation and deterrence achieved through individual liability. Thus,
even though the tribe remains immune, the plaintiff is not without
a remedy against the officer as an individual. An apparent necessity
for forcing the tribe into court should not imply a waiver of all
immunity where remedies short of damages will sufficiently redress
grievances. This argument is principally supported by the policy
behind the immunity which exempts only certain wealth of the tribe
-its land base-to preserve it for future generations of dependent
beneficiaries. This policy has been articulated in the following words:
As rich as the Choctaw Nation is said to be in land and
money, it would soon be impoverished if it was subject to
the jurisdiction of the courts, and required to respond to all
198. Id. at 395.
199. Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D. N.M. 1971).
200. Id.
201. Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895) ; see the discussiov
of tribal immunity, supra, text accompanying notes 66-95.
202. See note 1 supra. Cf. I{ARV. COMM. at 1359-1360.
203. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397-398 (1971).
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the demands which private parties chose to prefer against
it. 204
Notably, the Court in Bivens did not create a remedy without
first articulating the need for sensitivity to countervailing consider-
ations: "The present case involves no special factors counseling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. "205 The
overriding federal policy against alienation of tribal lands is such
a consideration.
Assuming the possibility of individual liability, the tribal agent
will demand insurance as a condition of employment in order to
mitigate the possibility that he will be rendered impecunious by
a judgment. Because the agent is sued in his individual capacity,
immunity is not a defense. 2 6 Thus as to compensation, the limits
of the insurance must realistically reflect possible judgments. As
to deterrence, premiums paid by the tribe will reflect claims made
against the insurer. Thus, to minimize expenditures, the tribe will
be strongly motivated to control violations of the Act through rea-
sonable care in the selection and training of its agents. This factor
will also operate as a deterrent against the individual officer be-
cause his misdeeds will jeopardize his employment. Thus, the oper-
ation of this individual liability raises the Act above the Loncassion
court's characterization of it as an "unenforceable admonition, ' 207
and negates the need to infer a congressional waiver of immunity.
B. The Damage Remedy as Applied to Individuals
Both the Spotted Eagle and Loncassion cases also examined
the individual liability of tribal agents for violations of the Act.
The first clause of the Act, "No tribe in exercising powers of
self-government shall . . .,,,208 militates against individual liability.
The court in Spotted Eagle so concluded, noting that the Act,
like the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, is negative in form and
is directed against the tribe as a governmental entity.20 9 However,
the court relied on the district court's remand of Bell v. Hood:
[B]ut the rights described in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments are not 'federally protected' against invasion
by individuals. As said before, those amendments only 'fed-
204. Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372, 376 (8th Cir. 1895).
205. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
206. However, the policy against alienation of tribal lands is inoperative because the
individual Indian's land allotment is immunized from a judgment execution based on a
transaction occuring prior to the issuance of patent in fee by 25 U.S.C. § 354 (1970).
See Mullens v. Simmons, 234 U.S. 192 (1914).
207. Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D. N.M. 1971).
208. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
209. Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D. Mont. 1969).
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erally protect' rights from invasion by the federal govern-
ment.
2 1 0
In reaching the opposite conclusion on the issue of individual
liability under the Act, the court in Loncassion noted the similarity
between the Act and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, but relied
on Bivens as reflecting applicable law: violation of Fourth Amend-
ment rights by a federal agent acting under color of his authority
creates a federal common law action for damages. 211 Because the
court found that the freedom from unreasonable interference and
use of excessive force by police officers accrued from Fourth Amend-
ment rights, individual liability of the tribal policeman was based
on the Bivens rationale.
Individual liability of the tribal officer for violations of federally
guaranteed rights under the Act appears to be an accurate appli-
cation of Bivens. Because the federal courts will never be forced
to create a common law tort against abuse by state officers insofar
as the action of state officers in violating constitutional safeguards
pursuant to state law is prohibited by federal statue,212 Bivens
might be limited to federal officers over whom the federal courts
have a supervisory control. Such a limitation on Bivens should not
prevent recovery against most tribal police officers. Settler v. Yaki-
ma Tribal Court21 3 and Colliflower v. Garland21 4 have found federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction to hear the petition of a person incar-
cerated by a tribal court because these courts function, at least
in part, as "arms of the federal government." 21 5 To support its
characterization of the tribal courts, the court in Colliflower stated:
"Originally they were created by the federal executive and imposed
upon the Indian community, and to this day the federal government
still maintains partial control over them.1
21
Although the defendants in Settler had sought to distinguish Colli-
flower on the basis of federal funding, the court further elucidated
the characterization as including "the historical origin of the tribal
courts and their scope of authority. ' 217 Since tribal policemen are
officers of the court, they would be included in the "federal instru-
mentality" theory applicable to the twelve Courts of Indian Offenses,
and probably wherever the nexus between the tribal justice system
and the federal government was clear in both origin and current
control.
210. Id. at 90 (citing 71 F. Supp. 813, 818 (S.D. Cal. 1947) ).
211. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), cited .supra note 177.
213. 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969).
214. 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
215. Id. at 379.
216. Id.
217. Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1969).
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VI. PENDENT JURISDICTION
In three cases federal district courts have heard claims ex-
traneous to the Act under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. 18
Alleging excessive use of force by a tribal policeman, plaintiff
in Loncassion v. Leekity219 sought damages from the Pueblo and
the policeman individually. The court sustained its jurisdiction,
220
finding the requisite amount in controversy and that the action
involved a claim arising under the laws of the United States. 221
The plaintiff also asserted rights as a third-party beneficiary to
a contract between the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Pueblo con-
cerning the latter's assumption of police services. It was alleged
that the Pueblo had breached their contract by negligently hiring
and training the officer. The court concluded that "[t]hese allega-
tions state a claim upon which relief can be granted, which the court
may. hear as a pendant claim. ' 2 22 Since the court had already de-
cided that the Pueblo had waived its immunity through the contract,
223
it apparently felt plaintiff's claim thereunder to be within the juris-
diction of the state courts.
Plaintiffs in Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe224 sought equitable
and declaratory relief and damages against the tribe and its officers.
After finding that it had equitable jurisdiction over the tribe and its
officers,225 the court cited United Mine Workers v. Gibbs 26 as au-
thorizing pendent federal jurisdiction for damage claims arising un-
der state law, where there is a federal claim of sufficient substance
to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the courts. 2 7 The court found
that it had pendent jurisdiction over the damage claims because
they shared "a common nucleus of operative fact"228 with plaintiffs'
other claims. However, the court failed to specify the source of the
damage claim, except to note that it did not stem from the Act.
In Dodge v. Nakai229 plaintiffs sought an injunction against en-
forcement of an allegedly unlawful exclusion order, damages and
other relief. Without clearly specifying which of plaintiffs' grievances
the Navajo tribal court had power to redress, the court held that
plaintiffs' claims were properly before it, despite plaintiffs' failure
218. Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D. T.M. 1971) ; Spotted Eagle v. Black-
feet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969); Dodge v Nakal, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz.
1968).
219. 334 F. Supp. 370 (D. N.M. 1971).
220. Id. at 375.
221. Id. at 372.
222. Id. at 375.
223. Id. at 373.
224. 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969).
225. Id. at 89.
226. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
227. Spotted Eagle v Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D. Mont 1969).
228. Id.
229. 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
to exhaust tribal remedies.280 The court justified its holding by not-
ing that the non-Indian defendants would not be proper parties be-
fore a tribal court, and that litigating some claims before the tribal
court, only to have them again brought before the federal courts,
would create a multiplicity of suits. Although varying necessarily
with the facts of each case, these factors present the strongest ar-
guments in favor of pendent jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has delineated the doctrine of pendent juris-
diction in Hum v. Oursler2s1 and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.22
Plaintiff in the latter case, alleging that the Union had maliciously
interferred with his employment contract, sought relief under both
federal labor law and state common law. After noting that plain-
tiff's federal claim was of sufficient substance to confer subject mat-
ter jurisdiction and that the federal and state claims derived from
a common nucleus of operative fact, the Court concluded:
But if, considered without regard to their federal or state
character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordin-
arily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding,
then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is
power in federal courts to hear the whole.2 8
Circumstances could be hypothesized where a party, aggrieved
by a tribe's violation of the Act, also had a separate cause of action
in state or tribal court. Suppose, for example, that in enforcing an
exclusion order tribal policemen tortuously batter the party sought
to be excluded. Although the availability of state courts to Indian
plaintiffs has been settled in the affirmative,28 4 the question of whether
the tribal court has jurisdiction over a non-Indian remains unan-
swered.2 85 This example assumes the propriety of the non-federal jur-
isdictional base.
Where the federal claim arising under the Act was dismissed be-
fore trial, such as if the tribe had asserted its immunity from suit,
the court is bound by Gibbs to dismiss the non-federal claim as
well. 28 However, where a federal claim has become moot at a later
phase of the litigation, the Supreme Court has upheld, as an exer-
cise of discretion, the district court's retention of the state claim
230. Id. at 26.
231. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
232. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
233. Id. at 725.
234. Cbemah v. Fodder, 259 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Okla. 1966) ; Paiz v. Hughes, 76 N.M.
562, 417 P.2d 51 (1966).
235. E.g., 25 C.F.R. § 11.22 (1971) the text of which is, in part, as follows:
The Courts of Indian Offenses shall have jurisdiction of all suits
wherein the defendant is a member of the tribe or tribes within their
jurisdiction, and of all other suits between members and nonmembers which
are brought before the courts by stipulation of both parties. (emphasis
added)
236. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
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based on "the extent of the investment of judicial energy and the
character of the claim.
' 23 7
Even in situations where the federal claim persists throughout
the litigation, ". . . pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion,
not of plaintiff's right. ' 23 8 The Supreme Court noted the considera-
tions of ". . . judicial economy, convenience and fairness to liti-
gants . . . ," 39 while at the same time cautioning:
Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as
a matter of comity and to promote justice between the par-
ties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of appli-
cable law.
240
Thus, in exercising its discretion, a court must be sensitive to fac-
tors unique to claims brought under the Act and to the fact that
pendent jurisdiction is discretionary.
The analogue to comity as a limitation on pendent jurisdiction
is the opportunity to hear the state claim as a vehicle of further
effectuating a federal policy. Civil rights cases have been suggested
as illustrative. 2 1 In Anderson v. Nosser,242 an action brought by
civil rights demonstrators alleging abuse while they were incarcer-
ated, the court found pendent jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' state
law claims for cruel and unusual punishment, false imprisonment
and false arrest. Thus as to state claims arising out of a "common
nucleus of operative fact" with a federal claim under the Act, the
policy of deference to state courts suggested in Gibbs is weakest be-
cause the Act creates a civil rights case. Nevertheless, a court's de-
cision to deny pendent jurisdiction in such a civil rights case, where
the liability of the party dismissed was well-settled under state law,
has been upheld.2 43 Even in this favored area, the exercise of pend-
ent jurisdiction remains discretionary.
Although the tribal courts are not a very likely source for a
"sure-footed reading of applicable law, ' 24 4 they deserve the defer-
ence included under the principle of comity bcause of their unique
status as a dispenser of customary law.24 5 Arguably, where all liti-
gants are Indian-hence acclimated to the customary, non-adversary
237. Rosado v. Wyman,, 397 U.S. 397, 403 (1970).
238. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Note, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HAEv. L. REV.
657 (1968).
242. 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971) ; accord, Whirl v. Kern, 4,07 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1970) (false imprisonment); Sherrod v. Pink Hat Cafe, 250
F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1965) (assault and battery).
243. Patrum v. City of Greensburg, 419 F.2d 1300, (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 990 (1970).
244. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
245. Shepardson, Problems of the Xavajo Tribal Courts in Trdntion, 24 HuMN OR-
GANIZATtONS 250 (1965).
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character of the tribal court-hearing the claim within the full for-
malies of a federal court furthers neither convenience nor fairness
to the litigants.246 Also, the federal court's award-whether deter-
mined by judge or jury-will reflect non-Indian economic values. The
defendant is thereby subjected to a twofold disability because both
his capacity to pay and his victim's need for compensation are
measured by standards which do not take into account the economic
realities of the reservation. On the basis of these considerations it
is suggested that, as an exercise of their discretion, the federal
courts should deny pendent jurisdiction over claims resolvable in the
tribal courts.
CONCLUSION
This note has attempted to elucidate ways in which equitable and
declaratory relief under the Indian Civil Rights Act can be granted
with a minimum of disruption to the tribal system of self-govern-
ment; it is not concerned with congressional wisdom in passing the
Act. The ultimate ramifications of the Act on tribal self-government
remain to be seen. Congressional policy toward the Indian tribes has
continually vascillated between an attempt to assimilate them into
the Anglo-American mainstream, on the one hand, and an attempt
to keep them separate, as an autonomous entity, on the other. While
the Indian Civil Rights Act was no doubt designed to secure very
important and fundamental rights to Indians living under a tribal
system of government, its impact on the tribes cannot help but be
assimilative to a great extent. Though it cannot yet be known whether
decisions from litigation of similar constitutional provisions will be
applied part and parcel under the Act, it is doubtful whether the
tribal courts will assert any notable degree of independence for fear
that any pronounced self-reliance on their part will again result in
the devastating assimilationist policy of the 1950's.
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246. Although It was decided before passage of the Act, Littlell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486
(9th Cir. 1965), supports deference to the tribal courts as a limitation on pendent juris-
diction. Plaintiff had sought access to the federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) to
enjoin the tribal council from interfering with his retainer contract. In dismissing the
action, the court acknowledged the strong congressional policy of placing responsibility
for their own affairs with the tribal governments and stated In conclusion, "the basic
principle of diversity Jurisdiction requires reference of the suit to the Navajo Tribal
Courts." Id. at 489.

